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Abstract
In this paper we study how undeclared work aﬀects the wages of unde-
clared and declared workers and in particular the declared wage inequality.
Using individual data on Italy in the years 2000-2004, we compute a cross
and own labor demand elasticity for undeclared and declared work. We
provide an identiﬁcation strategy relying on Italian amnesty tax laws in
2002. Such laws have changed the shape of Italian undeclared sector caus-
ing a quick emersion of undeclared workers. Our results based on a set
of 2SLS regressions suggest that undeclared work: 1) decreases declared
wages, 2) adversely aﬀects undeclared wages and 3) raises wage inequality
in the declared sector. Undeclared work competes more with least skilled
jobs, while do not aﬀect high skilled jobs. We found complementarity
between undeclared workers and medium skills jobs. As a consequence
reducing undeclared work decreases wage inequality as well as it decreases
the earnings in medium skill sectors. This result suggests that undertak-
ing reducing undeclared labor-policy might encounter resistance because
of welfare loss of the medium class of workers.
Keywords: elasticity of labor demand, undeclared labor, wage inequality.
JEL classiﬁcation: H26, J23, J31.
1 Introduction
Tax evasion is a matter widely reported since the antiquity. Always diﬃcult
to be examined on either theoretical or empirical ground. From one side, theo-
retical economic models based on taxpayer rationality have shown to be unable
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1to describe properly the behaviour of an agents involved in the tax evasion set-
ting. If one applies standard game theory or any rational choice approach to
the problem of tax compliance, the level of penalties and enforcement that we
observe would appear insuﬃcient in explaining the degree of compliance with
the tax law. As a consequence, in the last 15 years behavioral and experimental
economists have started to address the problems of traditional economist cor-
recting assumptions and evaluating the variety of psychological reasons aﬀecting
the motivation of paying taxes, e.g. honesty, fear, sense of group membership
(Chorvat 2006, Alm et al. 1992).
On the empirical side, the lack of reliable data on evasion has always recalled
concerns on the validity of the results achieved by applied economists. Typical
data on evasion comes from administrative audit databases, which usually are
strongly selected data and not always provide suﬃcient information to deal with
such a selection. This happens mainly because audit authorities try to maintain
secrecy on their audit strategies. Some advances in this ﬁeld are made during
the last years using ad hoc surveys (Saez, 2011 WP, Lemieux et al. 1994) and/or
relying on individual audit data in which the source of information is enough
detailed to propose a proper selection model (Di Porto, 2011 and Di Porto et
al. WP)1.
This paper focus on undeclared labor, which is a particular kind of evasion.
As reported in Di Porto 2011, undeclared work is nothing more than the evasion
of labor taxes perpetrated by an employer against a Public Institutions collecting
social contribution. In countries like Italy, France or Germany employer collects
the social contributions for its workers. There are other countries in which the
employee is in charge for this payments. In both cases evading this payment
is just as under declaring a part of the hours worked. Therefore evading social
contributions is the the same that working in the undeclared sector. As other
types of tax evasions, the topic of undeclared work have diﬃculties to ﬁnd a
wide space in economic literature, motivations for that, are related to what
reported before, anyway undeclared work is, in terms of size, one of the main
issues of contemporaneous labor markets. In line with a recent study of OECD
we can assert that out of a global working population of some 3 billion workers,
nearly two-thirds (1.8 billion) are undeclared workers (Jutting and Laiglesia
2009). Schneider (2000) estimated that in the European area the number of
persons working in the unoﬃcial economy doubled within the two decades from
1978 to 1998. Italian undeclared work is employing in the last 10 years more
than 15% of the labor force. The same applies, to U.S., in which more that 18
million people are estimated to be illegal migrants (Justice 2005). BRIC (Brazil,
Russia, India, China) nations and eastern European countries are involved with
similar percentages too.
Although a large share of the more developed labor markets in the world is
constituted by this type of labor, economists knows relatively little about how
undeclared work aﬀects economy and about which plans has to be undertaken
1In the case of Di Porto (2011) the dataset includes information on both audited and
non-audited taxpayers allowing for comparison between the two groups.
2in order to let undeclared labor emerge. To be noticed that economists still
concerns about whether an increment of undeclared work would be considered
a sign of health or of decline for labor market (see C.C. Williams, 2010 for a
review of the main economic views on undeclared labor partecipation). The
problems of undeclared work comes more and more important in a period of
globalization and in a period of mass migration as the one we live. Migrant
workers are indeed those that in majority are employed in such a market.
This paper faces the challenge of building a reliable analysis on undeclared
work, estimating a short run labor demand elasticity for undeclared and declared
work in Italy. The aim of this paper is to study the eﬀect of undeclared work
on wage inequality. This is a microeconometric analysis, and as far as we know
it doesn’t exist anything of this kind in literature.
Putting together undeclared work and inequality seems to be a really inter-
esting exercise for several reasons: 1) We usually study inequality relying only
on the declared sector2, for instance, doing that for Italy leads to leave out from
the analysis the 15% of the real labor force at work. For some southern Ital-
ian regions undeclared sector covers almost 30% of the working relations (i.e.
Calabria). It would be important to ask ourselves which kind of analysis could
be undertaken forgetting 30% of the sample! 2) We are not just forgetting a
big part of the labor force, we are usually forgetting that part of labor force
that is less qualiﬁed (Boeri et al. 2002, Cappariello and Zizza, 2010) and much
more socially excluded. Intuitively, forgetting undeclared work in an inequality
analysis leads to a sure underestimation of the phenomenon. It is worth noticing
that till now, we didn’t mention about the consequences of such large share of
undeclared labor is at work on the whole economy. What happens when a big
part of these emerge? Or conversely submerge? Does emersion policy aﬀect real
wage inequality (the one computed considering declared and undeclared work-
ers), or declared wage inequality (the one usually taken in consideration in the
economic literature)? In addition, it seems to be very interesting to understand
which kind of workers is more aﬀected by this emersion/immersion eﬀect.
Our estimations based on a set of 2SLS regressions lead to the following con-
clusions, Undeclared Work: 1) decreases declared wages, 2) adversely aﬀects un-
declared wages and 3) raises wage inequality in the declared sector. Undeclared
work competes more with least skilled jobs, while do not aﬀect high skilled jobs.
We found complementarity between undeclared workers and medium skills jobs.
As a consequence reducing undeclared work decreases declared wage inequality
as well as it decreases the earnings for medium skilled workers.
The paper proceed as follows: section two explains the institutional setting
in which we develop our analysis, in particular we focus on the eﬀect of amnesty
tax law on undeclared work. This is useful to identify supply change in un-
declared sector (we explain in a following section (4.2) how to use a shock in
the undeclared work supply (produced by the amnesty policy) to build instru-
ments for our labor demand function). Section three describes the theoretical
2All the databases normally used for Labor market analysis reports individuals that are
declared working to the authorities: Labor force surveys, employers-employees datasets etc
3framework in which we move. Section four shows the empirical analysis and the
identiﬁcation strategy. Section ﬁve displays the empirical results. Section six
concludes.
2 Institutional settings: The amnesty tax law
Look at ﬁgure 1! It is shown the full time equivalent (FTE) undeclared work
trend in Italy together with the FTE declared work trend, the curves are log
transformations of the data while the source is the Italian institute of Statistics
ISTAT3. The pattern of the two curves is similar (years 1990-2001) except for
the variation that starts in 2002 and end in 2003 in which the two curves restart
their trend. This shock was caused by 3 diﬀerent amnesty tax laws decided by
Italian government in the year 2002. In particular we talk about:1) Law n. 189,
30-July-2002; 2) Law n. 222 9-October-2002, 3) Law 383/2001.
These laws were planned in order to amnesty evasions on social security
contribution payments. The ﬁrst two were scheduled in order to let emerge
migrant undocumented workers employed in the undeclared sector and were part
of a much bigger law package known as Bossi-Fini law. The third was aimed in
order to stimulate emersion of any type of undeclared worker native or not. In all
the cases the mechanism for the amnesty was simple and similar. The employer
in charge for the contribution had to declare the months worked by its workers
without compliance of the labor tax payments (with an obliged minimum of 3
months of under-declaration to be reported in order to be taken in consideration
for the emersion). A lump sum tax based on the number of months evaded4 was
the fee to be paid in order to let the worker emerge. In the case of migrants a big
incentive to the emersion was provided by the promise of providing residential
documents to all of those workers that declared theirselves for the emersion.
Therefore in this case the economic incentive for the employer, produced by a
reduced payments of contribution, adds to the strong social incentive for the
workers. Being recognized as resident solve several practical problems either
reducing stigma or open at the possibility of calling for the provision of public
services (i.e. healthcare, housing etc). For native workers the mechanism of
evasion was leaved just on the economic incentive for the employer and for a
supposed stigma reduction. Government promoted its campaign of emersion
strongly by the mean of media, advertisement and using social security auditor
to inform ﬁrms and workers.
The dynamic induced by these laws is pretty clear from the table, a labor
market in which the ratio between FTE declared and declared remains almost
the same for several years, it inverts for a very short period his trend. Undeclared
work reduces in the short run, provoking an expansion on the declared sector,
3ISTAT undeclared work indicator is an indicator provided by ISTAT together with other
source on shadow economy in Italy, it is considered the most reliable indicator from OECD
and it is based on a very complex computation of various source of information either from
the household side or from the ﬁrm side.
4For the detail on the payments see Stame (2004) or Anastasia et al. (2005)
4to be noticed that anyway in terms of FTE the expansion do not balance the
reduction in the other sector. Undeclared workers enters just partially in the
declared sector and those that emerge remains for a very short time in it. As
noticed in Anastasia et al. (2005) 70% of the undeclared emerged disappears
before 2004 from the market. This dynamics reveals a very simple picture. A
competitive labor market producing in equilibrium at a certain point manages
to return very quickly at the same point if all of the production factors remain
unaltered. To be noticed, that those laws were just aimed to recover some
evasion through the mechanism explained, nothing was planned in order to
maintain this new supply of labor at work in the long run. Italian market
is pretty slow in his adjustment and during the period 2002-2004 showed the
same characteristics in term of productivity, labor costs, wages etc. Some of the
emerged workers simply never start working in the declared sector, or they do it
just for a very short term. Migrant satisﬁed for their new residential status ﬁnd
simply a way of "returning in the shadow" or take advantage of their new status
for new destination in Europe5. The result is a supply shock that do not alter
anything else in the labor market. We use this setting and this shock induced
by the amnesties of 2002 to carry out a causal analysis on the implication of
undeclared work on inequality.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5It is well-known that Italian labor market is a ﬁrst landing for migrants arriving from
middle East and Africa. Those usually try to go in central Europe (i.e. France or Germany)
which is a more strong welfare magnet.
53 Theoretical settings
In this section we brieﬂy sketch the theoretical implications of increased
undeclared work supply. The aggregate production function we use is the very
common and popular Cobb-Douglas aggregation:
Y = AKαN1−α (1)
where A is exogenous total factor productivity, K is the physical capital and
N is a CES aggregate of two diﬀerent types of labor, undeclared and declared.






where ρ is a function of the elasticity of substitution σDU between the two
type of labor (ρ = 1−1/σDU), θU and θD are the share parameters summing to
1. Competitive market imposes that all factors are paid their marginal product,












































Given those equations it is then straightforward to show the eﬀects of an
increase of undeclared employment on declared and undeclared wage. Taking
partial derivative of 3 and 4 we obtain the eﬀect of an increase of undeclared




















where SU = wUNU/wUNU + wDND is the share of overall wages paid to
undeclared workers. In order to discuss these expressions we need to take into
account the supply of physical capital, that is, whether it is supplied ﬁxed or
perfectly elastically. First consider the case in which capital is ﬁxed. Increased
supply of undeclared workers reduces both declared and undeclared wages by
lowering the capital-labor ratio of the economy. Further, if undeclared and
declared labor are perfect substitute (σDU → ∞), declared and undeclared
6wages decreases by the same amount αSu. Whereas, if undeclared and declared
labor are imperfect substitute (or q-complements), there will also be a positive
eﬀect on declared wages operating by the term 1
σDU Su. Which of the two eﬀects
on declared wages prevails is an empirical matter. Let consider now that capital
is supplied perfectly elastically, so that α → 0. As the capital can adjust freely
to the changes of labor, undeclared supply does not aﬀect the capital-labor
ratio and if the two labor input are perfect substitute no changes in wages
occur. While if we consider imperfect substitutability undeclared wages lowers
and declared wages increase. For the empirical exercise we carry out in the
following sections we focus on the short-run labor demand elasticities, as we
consider exogenous variation in the supply of undeclared workers which only
applies in the short-run. So, the case of perfectly elastic capital can be ruled
out, and the simple model outlined above fairly predicts a drop in wages for
both type of labor.
The previous production function considers declared and undeclared labor
as homogenous input. We can relax this assumption by taking into account
diﬀerent broad education groups of the workforce. In doing so, we allow for labor
input to be comprised of high-skill declared workers and the aggregate between
undeclared and low-skill declared workers. The choice of considering undeclared
labor as an aggregate is merely practical, because in the empirical part we exploit
a source of exogenous variation only in the total full-time equivalent undeclared
workers. The aggregate production function is still described by (1), while N is







where γ is a function of the elasticity of substitution σHA between the two
types of labor (γ = 1−1/σHA), θH and θA are the share parameters summing to
1. Further we assume that the labor composite NA is itself the CES subaggregate






where η is a function of the elasticity of substitution σU−LD between un-
declared and declared low-skilled workers. θU and θD are the corresponding
relative eﬃciency parameters.
In competitive market the marginal product for each labor supply equates to
the corresponding wage. Then the ratio of the wage rate of high-skill declared
workers to the wage of low-skill declared workers equates to the ratio of the









+ (γ − 1)lnNH − (ρ − η)lnNLD − lnθD − (η − 1)lnNLD (9)
7Diﬀerentiating equation 10 with respect to NU we obtain the eﬀect of an in-















where SU is the share of overall wages paid to undeclared workers and SH is
the share of overall wages paid to the high-skill declared workers. An increase in
undeclared labor increases the declared wage skill premium if undeclared work-
ers compete more with low-skill declared than high-skill declared workers, that
is, when η > γ or equivalently when the elasticity of substitution between unde-
clared and declared low-skill workers is higher than the elasticity of substitution
between the high-skill declared and the aggregate labor input.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Empirical model
We use two stage least square instrumental variable (2SLS IV) estimator to
estimate the models 5 and 6 reported below.
lnwirt = αr + ζ2004 + bi + X0
irtβb











A strategy close to the one we use can be found in Acemoglu et al. 2005.
In model 5 wirt is our dependent variable and represents the hourly net wage
of Italian individual workers drawn by two diﬀerent wave of cross sections for
the year 2000 and 2004. The data we use are derived by two sources: SHIW
which is a Bank of Italy survey on households and ISTAT non observed economy
indicators, the source from which we obtained the graphs in ﬁgure 1. Both of
the sources will be explained in details in 4.3. wirt varies among individuals in
20 italian regions and two periods, one before and one after the policy shock
of 2002. On the right side, we introduce αr a regional ﬁxed eﬀect, ζ2004 a
time dummy and a matrix X0
irt of covariates aimed to control for the individual
worker characteristics. We choose these covariates selecting on what are usually
called pre-choice characteristics, so determinants belonging to the worker before
the choice of the jobplace6. bi is a dummy to identify undeclared workers, this
information is present in the SHIW survey (see section 4.3). γ and δ are the
coeﬃcients of major interest for our research. γ is the coeﬃcient of Urt
Drt which
6These are job experience and its square, educational level, the interaction between expe-
rience and educational level, a dummy for part time job, a dummy for migrants and a dummy
selecting workers living in urban areas. All these variable are interacted with a dummy for
undeclared worker and the time dummy for 2004.
8is the ratio between regional undeclared work supply and regional declared work
supply, these is expressed in log of FTE. δ is the coeﬃcient of the interaction
term bi times the log of Urt
Drt. These last two covariates are derived by the
indicator of FTE workers provide by ISTAT. A variable of such kind represents
the equilibrium between supply and labor demand in the market. As we said, we
will estimate a set of short run labor demand elasticities, therefore to do that we
need to solve a classical problem of identiﬁcation. We suggest the identiﬁcation
strategy in 4.2 in which we explain how to use the policy shock induced by the
2002 amnesty tax laws in order to build a reliable set of instruments. Once
identiﬁcation problem is solved we could read the coeﬃcients γ and δ as follows.
γ represents a variation of the wages of declared workers induced by a variation
of the relative supply Urt
Drt. The sum of γ and δ represents the inverse of the own
wage elasticity for undeclared labor, therefore it describe how a change in the
relative supply of undeclared workers aﬀect undeclared workers wages. δ is the
inverse cross elasticity, so describes how a change in relative supply aﬀect the
wage gap between undeclared and declared workers.
lnwD
irt = αr + ζ2004 + hi + X0
irtβh






















Model 6 is very similar to model 5 but here we use individual data on the
declared side of the labor force, thus just declared workers. wD
irt is the wage of
an individual declared worker in one of the 20 italian regions, in 2000 and 2004.
We still have regional, time ﬁxed eﬀect dummies and a matrix of pre-choice
covariates equal to the previous one. hi represents a dummy for the highest
skill group of workers. π and λ are our coeﬃcients of interest. Following the
same reasoning for the previous model once we have solved for the identiﬁcation
problem via 2SLS, π represents a variation of the wages of low skill declared
workers induced by a variation of the relative supply. The sum of π and λ
represents the inverse of the wage elasticity for high skill labor while λ is a
measure of inverse cross elasticity, so describes how a change in relative supply
aﬀect the wage gap between low and high skill declared workers. Finally, the
ratio between the two cross elasticities (π+λ/π) tells us which education group
undeclared labor supply is closer substitute for. Speciﬁcally if π + λ/π<1 it
implies that undeclared labor has a larger wage impact on high school (less
than high school) graduates; so undeclared workers are closer substitutes for
high school (less than high school) than for college declared workers, and the
opposite holds if π + λ/π>1.
4.2 Identiﬁcation strategy
We identify our labor demand function using the policy shock provided by
the amnesty tax laws in 2002. As mentioned before this event induced an exoge-
9nous contraction in the undeclared sector. In the short run we can easily assume
no salary adjustment, to be remembered that the contraction of undeclared la-
bor is not perfectly compensated in the declared sector, this is accompanied
by a very short permanence of the emerged worker in the declared sector. This
induce to think that labor market in the short run do not adjust, saving its pecu-
liarity in terms of capital, production, factors productivity and so on. Emerged
workers cannot be taken in a market that maintains this old equilibrium and
therefore undeclared workers: 1) never enters in the declared sector or 2) are
quickly rebounded by the declared sector into the undeclared one.
What we need to identify our labor demand is an instrument Zr,t for the
relative supply, so we can be sure that 5 and 6 describes movement on the
demand curve. An instrument of this kind have to be correlated with the log of
Urt
Drt and have to be exogenous, implying: E(εirt|Zi,t) = 0. Model 5 and 6 are
interaction models, so given a reliable instrument Zr,t for Urt
Drt, it follows that
bi ∗ Zr,t is a reliable instrument for bi ∗ Urt
Drt .
We set
Zr,t = ζ2004 ∗ Ar,2004 (13)
where Ar,2004 = (FTE∗
und − FTEund)r,2004. We compute Ar,t starting from
the series of FTE data provided by ISTAT, using a simple AR(1) model we
predict the value of FTE undeclared in 2004 FTE∗
und. This has to be seen as
a sort of synthetic counterfactual value, which is the percentage of undeclared
FTE workers in the market if no policy shock had been taking place7. In fact
this is computed just taking information before 2002. We subtract this predicted
value to the actual value of FTE in 2004 so we obtain a proxy of the people that
have registered for the amnesties. We multiply this proxy for a dummy which
is one in 2004 obtaining our instrument Zr,t.
4.3 Data
We used two source of data: two individual cross sections by SHIW, the
survey provided by the bank of Italy, some summary stats of these data are
summarized in Table 2. We have around 2700 individual per each year. SHIW
survey provides information on labor tax evasion and are extensively used in
the last years in order to get micreconometric evaluation on undeclared sector
(for an example see Cappariello and Zizza, 2010). We deﬁne undeclared work-
ers individuals negatively replying to the following question: Considering the
lifetime work experience of...(name), did he/she ever pay, or his/her employer
pay, pension contributions, even for a short period (and even if long ago)? If
an individual replies negatively stating and, at the same time, he or she has
been working, this means he or she has been working in the undeclared sector.
Moreover we add to those individuals who even though reply positively at the
question they did not pay social contributions for most of their working career.
7Card 2010 use predicted values of migrants in a very similar setting in order to instrument
relative supply of migrants versus native workers in US.
10Undeclared workers shows to be less educated than declared; a greater share of
non-native workers are employed in the undeclared sector then natives. Data
on FTE declared and undeclared labor where taken directly from ISTAT non
observed economy indicators. These are regional data provided by ISTAT every
year, the trend of such data stands clear in table 1.8 The methodology to de-
termine the FTE undeclared work indicator is fairly complicated and need the
use of many diﬀerent source of data from the side of households and ﬁrms (see
for a detailed explanation OECD, 2004).
Table 1: Main descriptive statistics of the sample .
2000 2002
Declared Undeclared Declared Undeclared
log of hourly wage 2.03 1.71 2.05 1.83
(0.40) (0.51) (0.4) (0.51)
Tertiary education 7% 5% 6% 6%
Secondary education 42.4% 25% 44% 29%
Primary education 50.6% 70% 50% 65%
Years of potential ex-
perience
20 14 20.3 15.4
(12.1) (11.4) (12.1) (12.2)
Non-native 2.9% 9% 7% 16%
North 51% 24% 50% 28%
Centre 21% 14% 23% 20%
South 28% 62% 27% 52%
No of observations 2703 2606
5 Results
5.1 Main ﬁndings
In this section we show the results of the empirical models outlined above.
Table 2 depicts results from OLS estimates of equation 7. The point estimates
in the ﬁrst two rows of table 2 corresponds to γ and δ of equation 7. The
estimated models I-V diﬀer from each other for the covariates we control for.
Model in column I is the baseline estimate; it only allows for the relative supply
of undeclared workers, time and regional ﬁxed eﬀects. Models in column II and
III include a set of human capital and social characteristics covariates, and inter-
actions with an undeclared worker dummy. Models IV and V add interactions
of the covariates with a year 2004 dummy. Furthermore, in order to take into
account some regional variation, models III and V allow for 2000 regional share
8OECD considers ISTAT non-observed economy indicators a good practice of quantifying
underground economy, and it encourage the statistical oﬃces of the other OECD countries to
adopt a similar strategy (OECD 2004).
11of declared migrant, 2000 regional share of declared prime age workers, 2000
regional average education interacted with 2004 dummy. Summing γ and δ to
obtain an estimate of the inverse elasticity of undeclared labor demand, we ﬁnd
that a 10% increase in the relative supply of undeclared lowers declared wages
by 9-19%. At the same time, the wage eﬀect of relative supply on declared wage
is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Furthermore, taking the inverse of the
coeﬃcient δ, it seems that there does no exist substitutability between the two
type of labor whatsoever. Even tough informative, OLS estimates are biased
owing to identiﬁcation issue as discussed above. From this reason we do not
consider highly reliable the ﬁndings in table 1.
Table 2: OLS estimates of elasticities of demand and substitution between undeclared and
declared workers.
I II III IV V
ln( U
D) -.01 (.04) -.03 (.03) .06 (.06) .07*(.04) .07 (.06)
ln( U
D)∗Undeclared -.12*(.07) -.16**(.07) -.16**(.07) -.15*(.07) -.15*(.07)
No of observations 5309 5289
∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗ Signiﬁcant at 10%. Standard errors (in parentheses) account for clustering on
region and year of observation. Model I is a baseline estimates; it controls for time eﬀect and regional
ﬁxed eﬀect. Models in column II and III include a set of human capital and social characteristics
covariates all interacted with an undeclared worker dummy. Models IV and V add interactions of
the covariates with a year 2004 dummy. Further models III and V allow for 2000 regional share of
declared migrant, 2000 regional share of declared prime age workers, 2000 regional average education
interacted with 2004 dummy.
To obtain reliable estimates we estimate equation 7 by two stage least square
(2SLS) using as instrument the diﬀerence between predicted and actual FTE
undeclared workers as discussed in section 4.2. Table 3 shows the 2SLS esti-
mates of the empirical model 7. At the bottom of table 3 are also reported
the customary F-test and partial R2 to check the reliability of the chosen in-
strument. The F statistics is fairly greater than the threshold value of 10, and
the partial R2 takes values from 0.17 to 0.36. Taking together theses checks
prove that the instruments are highly signiﬁcant in explaining the variance of
the endogenous variables. The point estimate of the parameter δ is in all cases
negative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The point estimate of γ is neg-
ative and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the models of column III and V,
our preferred speciﬁcations. Summing γ and δ we obtain the eﬀect of an in-
crease of the relative supply of undeclared workers on undeclared wage.9 Then
a 10% increase in relative supply lowers undeclared wages by 5-5.8%. This wage
eﬀect is consistent with an own labor demand elasticity between 1.7 and 2 in
absolute value. They are quite similar with the ﬁndings in Fortin et al. (1994),
who obtain a wage eﬀect of undeclared working hours equals to 0.70-0.72, cor-
responding to an elasticity of 1.3-1.4. The rise in relative supply of undeclared
9Wald test of the joint signiﬁcance of δ and γ always rejects the null hypothesis that the
two parameters are jointly equal to zero.
12Table 3: 2SLS estimates of elasticities of demand and substitution between undeclared and declared
workers.
I II III IV V
ln( U
D) -.19 (.17) -.23 (.19) -.27**(.13) -.24 (.15) -.28**(.13)
ln( U
D)∗Undeclared -.31**(.14) -.31**(.16) -.31*(.17) -.28*(.16) -.29*(.16)
σU = 1/γ + δ 2 1.85 1.72 1.92 1.75
σDU = 1/δ 3.22 3.22 3.22 3.57 3.45
F-test 2.25; 43.13 1503.69; 405.82 872.03; 387.91 612.53; 386 848.86; 377.35
Partial R2 .17; .20 .36; .13 .25; .13 .19; .13 .24; .12
No of observations 5309 5289
∗∗ Signiﬁcant at 5%, ∗ Signiﬁcant at 10%. Standard errors (in parentheses) account for clustering on region and year
of observation. Relative supply of undeclared labor is instrumented by the diﬀerence between predicted and actual
FTE undeclared workers multiplied by a 2004 dummy. Model I is a baseline estimates; it controls for time eﬀect and
regional ﬁxed eﬀect. Models in column II and III include a set of human capital and social characteristics covariates
all interacted with an undeclared worker dummy. Models IV and V add interactions of the covariates with a year 2004
dummy. Further models III and V allow for 2000 regional share of declared migrant, 2000 regional share of declared
prime age workers, 2000 regional average education interacted with 2004 dummy.
workers also aﬀects the declared wages; however the impact is less negative. A
10% increase in relative supply lowers the undeclared wages relative to declared
wages by 2.8-3.1%. This value corresponds to an estimates of the elasticity of
substitution σDU of 3.22-3.57, implying that declared and undeclared labor is
highly but not perfectly substitutable. Fortin et al. (1994) ﬁnd a smaller value
of the cross wage elasticity even tough not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1. The
diﬀerence is likely explained by the diﬀerent approach of Fortin et al. (1994);
speciﬁcally, they focus on a sample of Canadian workers employed in both reg-
ular and non-regular sector, and they are mainly interested in understanding
the individual choice of supplying also non-regular hours of work in response
to changes in labor tax rate. Our sample, while likely including also this kind
of workers, is comprised of people been stuck with high probability in the un-
derground sector. Moreover, considering the large share of undeclared workers
in total employment in Italy, it is reasonable to assume, at least in principle, a
higher degree of substitutability between the two labor input.
5.1.1 The eﬀect of undeclared work on regular wage inequality
Estimates in table 3 have shown that changes in undeclared labor supply
aﬀect the average wage of declared workers by a remarkable amount. However,
the wage eﬀect may interest diﬀerent segments of the declared wage distribution.
If undeclared workers are closer substitute for declared workers at the bottom
of the wage distribution, greater undeclared labor supply raises declared wage
inequality. We explore this issue by estimating equation 8. We ask how increase
13in relative supply of undeclared labor aﬀect declared wage distribution at dif-
ferent educational levels. We split our declared workers sample in three broad
education groups: college (CLG), high school (HS) and less than high-school
(LHS). Speciﬁcally, college are all those individuals who get a college or higher
education degree; high school are workers with a high school diploma; and less
than high school are all those workers with a primary education degree and or no
education. Then, we run separate estimates for the CLG-HSC and HS-LHSwage
premium. College-high school (high school-less than high school) labor supply
also directly aﬀects the relative declared college (high-school) wage, thus, in
estimating equation 8 we need to take into account those relative supplies. As
results, we also control for college (high-school) relative supply in models of col-
umn I, II, and VI of table 3. treating it as exogenous. Furthermore, we consider
the case of no correlation between college (high school) relative supply and the
instrumented undeclared relative supply. Models of column III, IV, VII and
VIII of table 3 takes such approach. Table 4 shows results for the high school
graduates and people with less education. Growth in undeclared relative supply
exerts a negative wage eﬀect on LHS workers and a positive eﬀect on the HS-
LHS wage inequality. Speciﬁcally, a 10% increase in undeclared relative supply
drops LHS wages by 2.6-3.8%, consequently it raises the HS-LHS wage ratio by
2.8-4.4%. By taking the ratio of the cross elasticities of undeclared labor for
high-school and less than high school, in all cases we obtain a value less than
1, implying that undeclared labor is a closer substitute for workers with less
education. Table 5 displays analogous estimates of equation 8 for college-high
school diﬀerential wage premium. Although the point estimates reveal negative
wage eﬀects on wage diﬀerentials they are not signiﬁcant diﬀerent from zero,
suggesting that undeclared labor is not a substitute for these types of labor. In
conclusion, the eﬀect of an increase of undeclared labor seems to aﬀect more
the less than high school declared workers relative to high school graduates. As
a results, an upsurge of the aggregate undeclared labor inﬂates wage inequality
between these two groups; furthermore, given that we do ﬁnd any signiﬁcant
wage eﬀects on the college-high school sample we can infer that wage inequality





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































166 Policy implications: the emersion/immersion
eﬀect
Policy makers has often debated on how to obtain the emersion of unde-
clared labor. However, as we asserted before undeclared activity ﬂourished and
as noted by Boeri et al. 2002 or Shnenider 2002, in the last years we have
assisted to an increase of the shadows activities, this can lead to think that
shadows activity are at certain extent tolerated. The picture is probably more
complicated and this paper gives a contribution to better understand the dif-
ﬁculties of inducing an emersion. We should probably ask, anyway, what is
emersion? and consequently what is immersion? Even if we have often listened
about that in political debates, it is probably good practice to try to give an
economic deﬁnition of this phenomenon. We deﬁne emersion from undeclared
sector as a passage from a worker (or many) from a state of activity in the
undeclared sector to a state of activity in the declared sector. Obviously, the
opposite applies for immersion.
Given this deﬁnition, an emersion scheme should be seen as a contraction
in the undeclared work supply, which is balanced by similar expansion in the
declared work supply. In such framework the elasticity of the labor demands
in both the market plays a crucial role in the consequence that emersion have
on wages. Our results can help to explain about emersion/immersion eﬀects at
least in the short run.
However, it is probably better to ask ourselves something else, in the light
of the evidence shown by our paper and by some others.
In fact, given the evidence debated in our analysis, a shift in supply from
a market (undeclared) followed by a consequent similar shift in the other (de-
clared), it is a myth! As noticed in Boeri et al. 2002, in a search and matching
model framework, a repression of shadows activities, induces a contraction in
undeclared activities but increase as well unemployment leading to an expansion
of the declared sector that can be partial or not existing. In our case the con-
traction in undeclared labor is obtained by an amnesty tax, standing repression
constant. Anyway, as we have seen from table 1 a contraction in the undeclared
sector is not followed by a similar adjustment of the declared counterpart. This
is explained in our framework by several issues, as remembered from an eco-
nomic point of view the amnesty was conduced without being accompanied by
any active labor market policy. It is possible to assert that a labor market in
equilibrium have rebounded out very quickly the new and more costly declared
workers. In addition, the new status of migrants have provided to them the
possibility to move to other locations in search for better jobs, as a consequence
emersion was just partial. The two pictures deﬁned by Boeri et al. 2002 and our
analysis seems to integrate each other, leading to believe that, at least in the
short run, pure emersion, as deﬁned before, can be very diﬃcult to be achieved.
Almost impossible, if a campaign of undeclared labor supply contraction is not
accompanied by any other policy supporting demand in the declared sector.
Our analysis however tells more in this partial emersion framework (that is
17a contraction in undeclared sector partially or not followed by an expansion in
the declared counterpart). We have shown that reducing undeclared labor sup-
ply, when leaving unchanged declared labor supply, induce important changes
in wages and inequality. First ameliorates undeclared wages and low skill de-
clared wages given non perfect substitutability. But and considerable, decreases
medium skill job wages given imperfect complementarity.
It is worth to notice that, this group of workers is the most widespread in
developed labor markets, as a consequence to induce a partial emersion conﬂicts
with their interests. Emersion policies are diﬃcult to be developed, Boeri et al.
2002 suggested because they can lead to unemployment, we add to their result
that, before this, politicians might be aware of the welfare loss induced by the
emersion, even the partial one, against an important group of workers/voters.
Anyway, we cannot ignore that partial emersion ameliorates inequality, ei-
ther declared inequality or real inequality. A policy maker might take care of
that, since this can create a signiﬁcant trade oﬀ with the medium skills welfare
loss.
Intuitively our ﬁndings remains unchanged even in a pure emersion frame-
work standing the fact that Urt
Drt decreases (even in this case) given an increment
of the denominator10, even if we believe that more work would be suitable in
order to discuss this case, in principal the sign of our inverse elasticity wouldn’t
change conducing to the same conclusions that in the partial emersion frame-
work.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we study how undeclared work aﬀects the wages of undeclared
and declared workers and in particular the declared wage inequality. Using in-
dividual data on Italy in the years 2000-2004, We compute an own and cross
labor demand elasticity for undeclared and declared work. Such empirical in-
vestigation requires a source of variation in undeclared labor that is able to
identify the labor demand we aim at estimating. We provide an identiﬁcation
strategy relying on Italian amnesty tax laws in 2002. Those have changed the
shape of Italian undeclared sector causing a quick emersion of undeclared work-
ers. Our results based on a set of 2SLS regressions are that Undeclared Work:
1) decreases declared wages, 2) adversely aﬀects undeclared wages and 3) raises
wage inequality in the declared sector. Undeclared work competes more with
low skilled jobs, while do not aﬀect high skill jobs. We found complementarity
between undeclared workers and medium skills jobs. As a consequence reducing
Undeclared Work decreases wage inequality but decrease as well the earnings
in medium skill sectors (emersion eﬀect). This result could suggest why policy
against undeclared work might be diﬃcult to be undertaken leading to a welfare
loss of this medium class of workers.
10In a pure emersion framework the undeclared labor supply contracts expanding declared
labor supply this lead as well
Urt
Drt to decrease.
18In addition we tried to add to our paper a number of new deﬁntion in or-
der to clarify some economics concepts which are usually confused in literature,
we hope that to deﬁne (un)declared wage inequality and/or emersion (pure or
partial) might help to conduce future work on this new concepts. Given the
widespread diﬀusion of the phenomenom of undeclared work in the contempo-
raneous years, an increased interest of economic analysis in this ﬁeld seems to
be necessary.
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